In politics, the enemy is never very far away, he is often even in his own family. Chirac and Giscard, Sarkozy and Villepin, the RPR and the UDF… In the realm of hatred and low blows from the right and the center, former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin rubbed shoulders with the greatest strategists of the Fifth Republic. And closely observed their modus operandi to overcome a rival. Supporting historical examples, the man who teaches leadership at ESCP provides for L’Express his own definition of the adversary and the way to rally him to his cause: “You don’t want to have someone in front of you one who gets up in the morning with the intention of having your skin and goes to bed at night with the same idea.” The father of “Yes needs the no to win against the no” also warns leaders – first and foremost the current head of state – against the exercise of power that is a little too solitary: “You need relays and a technostructure that can bring your strategy to life. Because in adversity, “the role of lieutenants is fundamental”. Interview.
L’Express: What difference do you make between an adversary and an enemy?
Jean-Pierre Raffarin: There is a big difference between the two. At the moment when we make the diagnosis, an adversary is not necessarily eternally an adversary whereas an enemy is “eternally” an enemy.
In power, we generally seek to ensure that the adversary does not become an enemy. You don’t want to be faced with someone who gets up in the morning with the intention of having your skin and goes to bed at night with the same idea. How many times have I seen Chirac walking people who were his opponents to the car? He believed that a rival could shoot power 100 and that depending on how you treated him, the power of the attack was less strong. Chirac never underestimated human relationships in the exercise of power.
Are all opponents equal?
Leadership is having a vision and a path compatible with that vision. From there, a leader can have opponents of vision. These can cause irritation or even anger, but they are not people who enrage you. On the other side, there is the one who, while you are convinced of your vision, puts obstacles in your way out of systematic hostility. At that moment, the brutality is much stronger in the confrontation. On vision, we tolerate the adversary because it is acceptable for people to have a different vision. But once you accept a vision, there is little tolerance on path choices.
In The prince, Machiavelli insisted on the importance of never mistreating an adversary, “unless you completely remove the power to take revenge”…
Above all, never humiliate an opponent… The case of Jean-Michel Boucheron, the former mayor of Angoulême, is a perfect illustration of this. The opposition denounced his lifestyle and many of his initiatives, but despite this, he managed to get re-elected. Until the day he humiliated a job seeker who happened to be an excellent accountant. As a result, the man spent three years going through the town hall’s accounts and finally succeeded in having the mayor sentenced to prison, which the Chamber of Accounts had never managed to do. All because he had a determination fueled by humiliation. The mayor had become his enemy, that was all he could think about.
“In politics, hatred is less common than you think”
During your three years and 25 days in the hell of Matignon, have you encountered enemies among your ministers?
Absolutely not. With each minister, I had areas of rivalry and areas of agreement, but my role at the head of this herd of ambitious people was to stay the course. During my years at Matignon, on the other hand, I had to battle with Ségolène Royal in Poitou-Charentes, (victorious against Elisabeth Morin, the candidate supported by Raffarin during the 2004 regional elections, NLDR), who had only one objective, to destroy what I had accomplished as president of the region. A campaign of rare violence, Ségolène Royal only attacked me, a rivalry which often became irrational. Now, I had other fish to fry with Matignon…
Precisely, in Matignon, you had in your government Dominique de Villepin, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Nicolas Sarkozy at the Interior, two sworn enemies. How did you manage this rivalry?
I tried to be as close to the facts as possible and not to be an actor in this war. When Villepin comes to warn me that a press article is about to come out in which Sarkozy is seriously implicated (the beginning of the Clearstream affair, NLDR), I tell him clearly that I must immediately notify the Minister of the Interior. If I hadn’t, I would have been at fault. The leader must be careful not to be involved in secondary conflicts. Because for me this was a battle that I considered secondary, the primary battles being those which concern the President of the Republic. From the moment we are not in a battle of vision but of means and methods, the one who must bring things together must be careful to stay on course.
But in politics, hatred is less common than you think. It is sometimes limited to circumstances. When circumstances change, hatreds change. We can say that there was a sort of hatred between Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Jacques Chirac, but they were both elected with the help of the other. In 1974, it was Chirac who beat Chaban-Delmas and thus helped Giscard, and in 1995 the latter would choose Chirac against Balladur.
However, between the two, there is 1981… and Chirac’s help to Mitterrand to beat Giscard in the second round of the presidential election…
Indeed. From 1976 (when Jacques Chirac slammed the door of Matignon, NLDR), they are in a phase where things cannot calm down. Chirac has a strategy which is the defeat of Giscard. Even if he says he “threw the grudge into the river”, Giscard will never forgive. But the fact remains that circumstances will change a few years later. By somehow stealing the UDF from Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Edouard Balladur will become the enemy. This is what I call the principle of the last hatred, the penultimate hatred attenuates before the last.
“In a Comex, you always need a few allies…”
The exercise of power is often a solitary exercise. How important is the entourage in a battle against an opponent?
The role of lieutenants is fundamental. Jacques Chirac was very surrounded. When he wanted to talk to parliamentarians, he had a whole team working with him on this gathering strategy. At the political level, we need allies who share the strategy. In a way, this is a question of management. If we look at President Macron today, we see that he lacks lieutenants to support these strategies both at the Elysée and in government. You can win without a party, but once in power you need a party to protect you, for human resources, for ideas… the absence of a powerful party is a weakness. We are currently observing this with the European elections and a majority candidate who has little notoriety.
When you seduce someone, you must also keep in mind that the notion of duration is important. You must then maintain this seduction once in power. But you cannot have the time available for all of this when you are number 1. You need relays and a technostructure that can bring your strategy to life.
Does this also apply to the manager of a company?
I believe him. In a Comex, you always need a few allies, exemplary people who provide proof that the strategy is good. In the role of lieutenant, there is this double mission: to protect the leader, therefore to take a certain number of blows in his place, and then relay him in terms of results.
Often also, the union is brought about by a common enemy…
Yes. This is what is happening today with China and Russia. There are a lot of rivalries between the two but basically, this rapprochement dates mainly from the moment when China and Russia made the United States their main common enemy. It was a rule that Henry Kissinger advocated and which was not followed: never put the interests of China and Russia in the same pot, which the West did in a certain way.
The enemies of my enemies are my friends, they say… But isn’t there a risk in following this old adage?
This is the risk of the volatile ally. Like Chirac before Giscard’s victory in 1974. On the international level we also know many situations of this nature. The United States has often conducted complex negotiations that backfired. Here again, it is the question of the distinction between the vision and the path. When you choose an ally simply on a path, they can escape you if they don’t have the same vision.
What Kind of Allies Are China and Russia?
Allies along the way, by circumstance. They have serious border rivalry problems. There is the question of India which is very close to Russia and not at all to China. Beijing hardly appreciates the war in Ukraine which results in the return of the United States and NATO to Europe while China is very attached to the idea of Europe as a pole of balance between the East and the west. In this regard, China would certainly not be sorry for a victory for Donald Trump in the United States, which heralds a break with Europe.
Do the enemy of vision and the enemy of path fight each other in the same way?
The first are adversaries who can be rallied through seduction, first by sharing a project, by leading them into a vision. On the condition of maintaining this relationship over time. You find them a place, a role, you entrust them with a responsibility. This is basically the story of the relationship between the right and the centrists in the Fifth Republic. As for the diehards, these opponents of the path who will never join you, only one solution: work to reduce the intensity of adversity, with a dose of respect, and above all avoid humiliation, what I call the Angoulême town hall syndrome (laughs).
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