How to talk about geopolitics without evoking the idea of power? In his latest book, The Ways of Power, geopolitics book prize 2022*, Frédéric Encel, professor at Sciences Po and the Paris School of Business, columnist at L’Express, describes the criteria and levers of power, but also the illusions it can give rise to. A useful reading to understand the excesses of the Russian president.
L’Express: We too often confuse, you write, “power and the hubris of power”. Did Vladimir Putin fall into this trap?
Frederic Encel: During his twenty-two years in power, Putin has shown strategic and pragmatic thinking, based on the intelligent use of power, aimed at the return of a greater Russia. He implemented it in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and the Donbass, each time with the certainty that his actions would bring him more than they cost him. With the invasion of Ukraine, the ideological quest took precedence over any strategic consideration. Risk taking is more important. In this, Putin confuses power and the hubris of power. It’s a total drift.
How could he have made such an error in judgment?
Putin built his power on a great weakness. It did not value knowledge and did not set up centers of excellence, it was content to make Russia what the USSR was a hundred years ago: a country producing hydrocarbons and of armaments. He favored the annuity, and this risks turning against him. Putin underestimated the West, Europe and the Ukrainian people. In this, we are dealing with someone whose level of thinking and strategic skills has sagged considerably in recent months and perhaps, according to many observers, in recent years. Is it related to the approach of the end of his life? To a mystical-messianic desire to leave a trace in the history of Russia? To a paranoia in relation to the Covid? Or the harmful influence of the Rasputins who whisper in his ear? It is still too early to know.
Power can also, you say, assert itself through diplomacy. But in Ukraine, she almost…
For several decades, it has been considered in Western Europe that diplomacy makes it possible to avoid the use of force. With Russia, this conception turned out to be a psychological trap. For Putin, diplomacy is part of propaganda activity. It is a scenography. It serves above all to “make believe” – and regardless of the weight of public opinion and international diplomacy. At the United Nations, Putin finds himself almost alone, but he cares little! What, for Westerners, constitutes a fundamental dimension of international relations, that is to say of the soft-power, is for Putin only an instrument in the service of a power which, in his scheme of thought, is acquired only by brute force.
Faced with Putin, is this idea of power progressing in Europe?
For the first time in its history, Europe is challenged to think of itself as a power. We see it through the recent decisions of the most pacifist European state since 1945, Germany! By his actions, Putin offers us a foundation stone. Now we have to build on it. The war in Ukraine shows us that the idea of strategic autonomy is not totally stupid… But who, in Europe, could constitute a strategic and military nucleus? France and the United Kingdom. Still formidable on the economic, military and diplomatic levels, these two powers could create a European dynamic, without thwarting the role of NATO. This idea may seem absurd: relations between London and Paris have not been at their best since the Australian affair. [NDLR : qui a débouché en septembre 2021 sur la signature d’une alliance entre l’Australie, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis]. And the presence of the whimsical Boris Johnson at 10 Downing Street does not make things any easier. But he won’t stay in power forever. Conversely, it can be noted that the Saint-Malo agreement (1998) and the Lancaster House process (2010) between the two countries work very well. As proof, there is always more cooperation and pooling between the French and British armies, to the point that we are talking again today about the construction of a common aircraft carrier.
Another power is in the process of being constituted, with the Sino-Russian rapprochement. How far can he go?
China and Russia have not signed an alliance in the strict sense of the term, but one can imagine that their economic partnership, geographically logical, will increase in power, especially with the opening of the Northeast Siberia, which allows China to buy gas at lower cost. But the war in Ukraine poses two major problems. Politically, China has always defended the principle of sovereignty. How to support Putin, who violates the sovereignty of kyiv? For Beijing, this is a fundamental contradiction. On the economic level, then, Putin’s adventurism in Ukraine has already caused the price of a barrel of oil to double. China, whose growth rate is around 4%, cannot live with a barrel at 150 dollars for long. Moreover, does Xi Jinping really have an interest in finding himself embroiled in a bloc war against the United States and the West, alongside an increasingly poor, less and less populated and weaker and weaker – evidence of its stagnation in Ukraine? In what way, moreover, will Russia be useful to him if he decides one day to seize Taiwan? For Beijing, war is negative, it creates instability. On this subject, there is a deep strategic hiatus between China and Russia. Let us add to this that these two countries are above all partners in terms of their rivalry with a West whose world architecture they contest. Russia is no less afraid of Chinese hegemonic ambitions. Today, there are more Chinese in Eastern Siberia than Russians. And in Kazakhstan, Moscow has made it clear to the Chinese, who are very active there, that this country is still in their sphere of influence… For all these reasons, a heavy strategic alliance between China and Russia seems unlikely.
Backend fetch failed
Meditation Guru:
XID: 589545347
Varnish cache server