Like Claude Erignac, assassinated in 1998 in Ajaccio by a certain Yvan Colonna, he belongs to the prefectural body. Between 2012 and 2014, he was also adviser to the Elysée for territorial affairs, responsible, among other matters, for relations with Corsica. Gilles Clavreul knows this file well and sees behind the anger that has been expressed in recent days the consequence of a climate of social and economic misery on the island. He is worried about the reaction of the government which, through the voice of Gérald Darmanin, the Minister of the Interior, is publicly considering granting “autonomy” to the community. An ambivalent formula which risks, he judges, encouraging all particularisms, from Brittany to Guadeloupe, to express themselves loudly. Hoping that the executive will crack under the pressure.
Do you understand the strategy of the government which opens the way to the “autonomy” of Corsica?
Gilles Clavreul The most amazing thing is the timing. We are one month away from a presidential election. Above all, that we react only when there are disturbances to public order is a problem. It gives the impression that we are under pressure.
Doesn’t this also send the message that violence pays?
It’s the risk. But there is another reading: it is also a way of putting Gilles Simeoni, the president of the community, back at the center of the game, of giving him some air in the face of nationalist pressure. He therefore appears to be the only legitimate and reasonable interlocutor.
On the merits, considering the “autonomy” of Corsica, isn’t this opening a Pandora’s box that will be difficult to close?
The calculation seems to me indeed very perilous. In a few days, we went from the issue of the return of particularly flagged prisoners, the DPS, to the island to that of autonomy: it’s a considerable spatio-temporal journey. This is basically a very Mitterrandian position, ambiguous as possible. Either it is a decoy to save time: it is quite possible but the Corsicans will then quickly realize it; all this will have been for nothing, we will have postponed the problems, so we will have aggravated them. Either Gérald Darmanin really proposes the opening of a process whose history is not written. Are we properly measuring the consequences? Considering autonomy as legitimate is a turning point not to be taken lightly. Autonomy, for the Corsicans, means co-officiating the language, a special resident status, the “corsisation” of jobs. That is to say restrict the possibilities of settling “continental”, and therefore create two categories of French. These are reforms that cannot be implemented under the current Constitution.
Gérald Darmanin evokes a “Polynesian” autonomy, which would remain within the framework of the Constitution.
First, the collectivities that enjoy special status are all overseas collectivities, or former protectorates. Including Corsica, a metropolitan territory, in this category would constitute a major precedent. Second thing, what the nationalists want goes far beyond the prerogatives of the Polynesian community. It would very clearly come close to the situation in New Caledonia. In this case, it must be said that the path of autonomy can lead to self-determination and independence. And go through a process which cannot be limited to Corsica and the Corsicans, but which must involve all French citizens, that is to say a referendum validation. Like in 1998.
Can this openness give ideas to other communities?
Of course. This is another major risk. What the Minister of the Interior has just said can be read as an encouragement for all the independence causes of the territory, in Guadeloupe, in Guyana, in Martinique, in the Basque Country, and so on. We can even go further, it encourages those who, in common law communities, Alsace, Brittany, etc., are asking for differentiation measures.
Can we not envisage an autonomy of Corsica which would remain within the strict framework of the Republic?
Yes, that would mean additional powers in tax, land and inheritance tax matters. But, once again, the nationalists will not stop there. They will have reason to think that it is by having the most appetite that we eat the most. That said, I’m not sure that the Corsican population, beyond the surge of recent days, massively wants self-determination. Simeoni’s victory is first of all that of a charismatic and shrewd man who represented a credible alternative to the old dynastic system that had run out of steam. The problem is that, so far, he hasn’t really been able to scale it; and the return of pressure from the nationalists will not help him. This is also what the Minister of the Interior has in mind: it is better to discuss with a tough but pragmatic Simeoni, rather than leaving the field open to the most radical.
For the “continental” opinion, isn’t it incomprehensible to open this file now?
There is a gap of perception that has continued to widen. In 1998, the assassination of the prefect Erignac caused almost unanimous indignation on the island. A quarter of a century later, some hold up the portrait of Yvan Colonna and make him a hero, a sign of the tireless work of the separatists to impose their narrative. When they speak of “political prisoners”, it’s the same. Corsica is facing major economic and social challenges, and it is legitimate for the State to support it. But its development is hampered by the omnipresence of patronage systems and de facto monopolies; and that is also the responsibility of elected autonomists, who cannot or do not want to put an end to it. They should realize that beyond “the French State”, to use their pejorative wording, there is also the opinion of the French people: how do they see all this, between the return of violence, a form of ingratitude vis-à-vis national solidarity and claims for preferential rights? You could call that separatism, right? It can also be recognized that not all claims are illegitimate. Refusing the lifting of “DPS” status, for example, may have given the impression that there was a particular severity towards these prisoners. Even the most republican Corsicans think so.