A few hundred meters from the border, the promontory enjoys a panoramic view of the northeastern part of the Gaza Strip. Israel installed its “Black Arrow monument” there to commemorate the operations carried out by its paratrooper units during the 1950s. The author of these lines was there at the beginning of September with Israeli soldiers. These then reminded us that the border was currently under control thanks to an anti-tunnel system combining state-of-the-art sensors and underground concrete walls, along the 65 kilometers of border. Enough to dissuade Hamas fighters from digging tunnels again to infiltrate, as they did in the 2010s.
But the surprise attack of October 7 revealed that this barrier, far from being a strength, has turned into a weakness for Israel. To everyone’s surprise, Hamas, thanks to a careful plan, managed to take the best of this Maginot line, taking advantage of a public holiday where the attention and means of response of the Israeli forces were less. The propaganda images revealed by the Palestinian group on social networks allow us to understand how it proceeded to enter Israeli territory and carry out murders and kidnappings. They reveal unprecedented planning and coordination for this organization considered a terrorist group by France, the European Union and the United States.
Hamas first blinded the numerous surveillance posts set up on the border. In the manner of what is done above the trenches in the war in Ukraine, he dropped grenades on the observation towers used by the Israeli military to observe the area. The operation was carried out in the same period of time by dozens of drones requiring, a priori, as many pilots. Then units attacked the barrier using explosive charges and, in some cases, bulldozers. According to the Israeli armed forces, the attackers created 29 crossing points, in particular taking control of the Erez border crossing, usually used by civilians.
All that remained was to send commandos through, via motorcycles or motorized vehicles. “With the major effect of surprise, their tactical mode was based on a process of infiltration of fighters then making it possible to launch dispersed but coordinated operations, placing the Israeli forces in dilemmas and increasing the response delay time tenfold,” notes Thibault. Fouillet, researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research. These are tactically seasoned forces, highly trained, perfectly coordinated, with real operational mastery.”
Some of them wore fatigues of the same color as those of the Israeli soldiers, notably those who invested the Reïm military base, headquarters of the Gaza division of the Israeli forces, in charge of the area. The crossing did not only concern the land. Other images showed incursions via sea, with marine commandos, and via air, using motorized sails, as hundreds of rockets were fired towards Israel.
These abilities come as no surprise. Training videos have in recent years shown Hamas militiamen practicing to fly such aircraft. The material means at their disposal were known. “Hamas now manufactures much of its own weapons, is developing drones and unmanned underwater vehicles, is preparing for cyberwarfare, and is poised to move upmarket from rockets to GPS-guided drones and missiles “, noted, in 2021, a report from the Jerusalem Center for public affairs.
“The Israelis have technological superiority, mass, but all this is circumvented by indirect fire from missiles and rockets, explains a French military source. And if they manage to destroy these vectors with their iron dome, they will not are still unable to counter-attack, that is to say, to neutralize the firing platforms and their operators. Their only way to do this is to clear the entire area with a ground operation, as in Gaza in 2008-2009, during the operation Hardened lead.” This only temporarily put an end to the rocket strikes, killing 13 Israelis and more than 1,300 on the Palestinian side, including nearly 900 civilians.
The toll of a new temporary occupation of Gaza promises to be even heavier, whether for Israeli soldiers or for Palestinian civilians and fighters from Hamas – and the other armed group, Islamic Jihad. “Hamas succeeded in the offensive phase, the most complex. But it also had to prepare for the defensive phase, with the objective of making the Israeli soldiers who will operate in Gaza pay an exorbitant cost,” said this military source.