Tatiana Stanovaya, founding chair of R.Politik, an independent think tank that analyzes power circles in Russia, and nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
L’Express: When Vladimir Putin came to power in early 2000, what was the weight of the oligarchs in Russia?
TS: At the time when Boris Yeltsin led the country, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we witnessed the emergence of a very narrow circle of businessmen, nicknamed the “seven bankers”. Very close to the president, they have an immense influence on political decisions. It should be remembered that during the 1996 presidential election, Yeltsin, whose popularity rate fell to 5%, owed his victory against the Communist Party only to the support of these oligarchs.
When Putin became president in 2000, he tried to make a deal with them: if they stayed away from politics, he left them alone. Those who disagree and dare to challenge the Kremlin are deprived of their property and must leave the country. But the real turning point took place in 2003. Mikhail Khordorkovsky, who had declared open war on Putin, saw his oil company, Yukos, dismantled, and was sent to prison for ten years. Putin then imposes an ultimatum: he demands that the oligarchs pay their taxes, they are no longer authorized to meddle in the affairs of the Kremlin and must share their profits with the government when it needs to finance important projects. After this shock, the oligarchs, paralyzed, fall into line and become ordinary “businessmen”.
But Putin then created his own class of oligarchs…
When Putin takes the reins of the country, he is alone, in a very hostile environment. Most regional governors oppose him. He even had to appoint a prime minister and a presidential chief of staff imposed by the Yeltsin family at the start. It took him several years before he could place trusted people in important positions.
He begins by appointing some of his closest allies to head state enterprises. Alexei Miller, whom Putin knew when he worked in the office of mayor of St. Petersburg, will lead the gas giant Gazprom. Igor Setchine, from the same circle, takes over the helm of the oil group Rosneft (which has taken over the assets of Yukos). Then, in 2007, Sergei Tchemezov – crossed in East Germany where both were KGB agents – took control of the state holding Rostec, created for him.
Putin wanted to entrust strategic sectors of the economy to those he considered “politically responsible” and patriotic. Create a new kind of political elite who, unlike the oligarchs of the Yeltsin period, could prioritize national interests over their personal profits (which did not prevent them from prospering financially). However, this special role does not give them the right to discuss domestic or foreign policy with Putin, nor to interfere in state affairs.
Tatyana Stanovaya
DMITRY KOSTYUKO
At the same time, another kind of businessmen, with close ties to Putin, appear – those who have created private companies and have enriched themselves through orders from the government and state-owned enterprises. Like the Arcady brothers and Boris Rotenberg, linked to the construction, banking and publishing sectors. When Putin needed to build a bridge in post-annexation Crimea, Arcadi Rotenberg agreed to risk being targeted by sanctions and spearheaded the project – a service the president will forever be grateful to him for.
Some oligarchs, however, seem linked to Russian politics, such as Evgueni Prigojine, behind the group of private mercenaries Wagner…
This is a third category of friends of Putin, whose activities compel them to interfere with Kremlin policy – not to change it, but to support it. Figures like Evgeni Prigozhin seek to do Putin a favor, replacing the state in areas where official authorities prefer not to appear – such as cyber warfare, media propaganda and internet provocations – and where the law may be powerless. Prigojine runs a “troll factory”, his own media, but is also known to be behind the Wagner Group, whose mercenaries were sent to Syria or Mali. Another example is Yuri Kovalchuk, who heads the influential National Media Group, a holding company that has gained political importance in the context of growing Kremlin control over the media. But even if they have an important influence, they act in the direction of the priorities of Putin and never dare to assert political interests which differ from those of the president.
A handful of Russian oligarchs, Mikhail Fridman, Roman Abramovich and Oleg Derispaka, have distanced themselves from the war in Ukraine: can their reaction spread?
These businessmen cannot be considered “friends” or close allies of Putin. Under Putin’s rule, they are allowed to continue doing business under the conditions I mentioned above, but they are not allowed to speak out on political issues and interfere in any way. any way in the affairs of the Kremlin. Putin’s personal attitude towards traditional businessmen is well known: he believes that they only think about their profits and are not able to take the national interest into account. Putin was therefore not surprised by their anti-war declarations. However, I do not exclude that the Kremlin tries to “recommend” them to be more “understanding” in view of the difficult situation to think more about how to support the state. These anti-war statements, however, should not be taken as a sign of opposition but rather as an expression of shock, amazement and discouragement.
Will Western sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion hurt those close to Putin?
They will suffer a lot financially, but not all in the same way. As for the leaders of state companies, the consequences of the sanctions for their sectors will be devastating, but it will not destroy them personally, since they are not owners, and they can continue to rely on the resources and the state support. They will also try to fill the void left by the departure of foreign companies, and to make themselves even more indispensable to Putin. As for those who render Putin various services, they will have even more opportunities to serve the Kremlin. The sanctions make them perfect victims of the “hostile West”, which guarantees them stronger protection from Putin.
Can the loyalty of those close to Putin waver after these new sanctions?
I find it hard to believe that anyone around Putin would doubt or express concern about his decision to go to war. All these businessmen depend entirely on the president, and have no prospects without him. They know that everything they own can disappear and that they risk a lot if the leader of the Kremlin loses power.
But what you need to know is that the very decision to launch the war was taken without any prior discussion, within the Russian elite. With the exception of a handful of military and secret service personnel, no one was consulted or informed. The oligarchs will have to adapt to the new situation in order to survive. But no one will speak. Nobody dares to suggest to the head of the Kremlin to reconsider his decision or to think about how to ease Western sanctions. Putin not only managed to surprise his close entourage, but also scare them.