In a hell of minefields, trenches, and under enemy artillery fire, the Ukrainian forces continue, meter after meter, their fierce fight to reconquer their territories occupied by the Russians. Nearly three months after the start of its counter-offensive, the Ukrainian army is approaching the second line of Russian defense in the region of Robotyne (south of the country).
But the gains made so far, considered modest, have raised concerns in Western chancelleries: will kyiv be able to meet its objectives? “In war, things are not linear,” recalls Michel Goya, a former colonel in the navy, now a war historian. “We cannot exclude ruptures, or surprises, he adds, even if for the moment, the Russians are holding out.” Interview.
L’Express: After almost three months of Ukrainian counter-offensive, can we really speak of “failure” as some do?
Michael Goya: No. It is too early to speak of failure, for the simple and good reason that the operation is not finished. Some may say it will never work, but ultimately it is speculation. War is not an exact science, and if the outcome of battles was known in advance, they would most likely not take place. Military operations are always very complex and very uncertain. So even if for the moment, we are witnessing a draw, we must keep in mind that the offensive is not over.
What could a successful counter-offensive look like?
Schematically, the success of a military operation of conquest can be measured by the size of the cities on which you manage to plant a flag. Therefore, if the Ukrainians get to Melitopol, it will be a great victory. If they get to Tokmak, it will be less spectacular, but enough to claim victory. On the other hand, if the Ukrainians do not manage to cross the Russian defensive coverage zone, and remain generally blocked where they are now, it will be a major disappointment. Unless we succeed in proving that the operation made it possible to bleed the Russian army white and inflict on it losses several times greater than those of the Ukrainians.
There is also the question of the long term. If Ukraine manages to break through the Russian defences, at what cost will this have been achieved? You have to be able to mount new operations in the future, and therefore not use up all your resources at once, or at least be able to replenish them very quickly.
How are the Russian defenses organized in the South?
There are three successive defense zones, each with a depth of several kilometers. The first of these is the forward cover area, which serves as a braking zone for the Ukrainian offensive. There is about a quarter of the Russian forces present in this sector. Behind it is the main defense zone, which contains about half of the Russian forces. Then there is the third zone, the back zone. It is that of the long-range artillery where we find in particular the multiple rocket launchers, the ammunition depots and the command centers.
Can the Ukrainians hope to break through them in the coming weeks?
It’s a possibility, because in war, as I said, things are not linear. Currently, there are two main lines of effort: south of Orikhiv and Velyka Novosilka. In these two sectors, the Ukrainians are beginning to approach the main line of defense.
There are fewer minefields or obstacles, but much more defense strongpoints. And there will probably be more fights than today. It will be at least as difficult to cross as the first zone. But if, during the month of September, the Ukrainians manage to overcome this main line of defense, then things will be much easier. The center of gravity of the Russian defense is really this main line of defense. It is therefore necessary to seize it, at least in part, all the stake is there.
What poses the most difficulties for Ukrainians today?
It’s Russian artillery. Today, we are all focusing on the battle taking place on the line of contact, because it is the most visible, with the progress of each other. But there is a second battle, which is played out in depth. Since mid-May, the Ukrainians have been methodically destroying Russian artillery located in the main defense zone and in the rear zone. The goal is to neutralize it, because that’s what bothers them the most. Indeed, as soon as the Ukrainians come into contact, they find themselves continually under a rain of shells.
If the Kyiv forces manage to destroy this rear defense, their advances will be greatly facilitated. And it would also allow the Ukrainians to concentrate their firepower on the Russian defenders facing them, rather than on their artillery. In any case, Ukraine has rather good results in the deep battle: there is undoubtedly some damage on the Russian side. One of the limiting factors, however, remains the Ukrainians’ lack of ammunition. If they could fire three times as many shells, they would probably have already won the battle.
Ukrainian soldiers from the 43rd artillery brigade fire the PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzer towards Russian positions near Bakhmout on June 15, 2023
© / afp.com/Anatolii STEPANOV
Are mines particularly problematic for Ukrainians?
Absolutely. Especially since the entire Russian defensive zone is covered not only with mines, but also with obstacles, trenches, a network of strongpoints and combat units. The mix of all these elements makes Ukrainian advances particularly difficult. In itself, even if a minefield is a hindrance, it is still possible to cross. But when you add the enemy artillery fire, and the rest of the defensive system, it’s much more complicated. Today, the majority of Ukrainian casualties come from artillery. Then there are the mines.
What role can the F-16s promised by Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway?
They won’t arrive early enough for the current offensive, but it will be an important asset for the next ones. They are excellent shooting platforms, especially useful for air defense. The F-16 is primarily a device for sending anti-aircraft missiles up to 150 kilometers. This will keep Russian aircraft at that distance at bay. Concretely, it will be very complicated for Russian helicopters – which constitute a real threat in this Ukrainian counter-offensive – to approach the line of contact, at the risk of being caught by a missile sent by an F-16. And it’s the same for Russian planes.
Then, the F-16 is also a platform to support ground forces. It allows you to fire projectiles to hit targets located at a great distance. Especially in the rear defense area: logistics, bridges, depots, or command posts.
What equipment do Ukrainians need most today?
155mm artillery shells. It is a critical ammunition, essential in many operations. Then, ATACMS missiles, which have a range that can extend up to 300 kilometers, and would allow them to multiply their strike capabilities in depth. Finally, they would need engineering equipment to overcome obstacles and destroy mines.
What state is the Russian army in?
It is a rather heterogeneous army but which, for the moment, manages to hold on. Since she is in a defensive position on a significant part of the front, it makes her job easier. The defender always has an advantage over the attacker. Moreover, she mounted a reverse attack in the northeast. This can pursue two objectives: either to hope that the Ukrainian force there is sufficiently weakened to be able to break through, or to attract Ukrainian reserves to the North, so that they cannot be used in the context of offensive actions. The Russians had some gains, but it’s still marginal.
Prigozhin’s presumed death could it have repercussions on the Russian army?
I don’t think that saddens the Chief of Staff of the Russian army, Valeri Guerassimov, nor the Minister of Defence, Sergei Choïgou… On the contrary, it comforts them in their respective places. In absolute terms, this is not necessarily good news for the Russian army, insofar as it did not shine with its skills. For the Russian regime, the main thing is that the fighters are loyal to the leader. For the rest, the future will tell us to what extent the military structure that was Wagner will pass under the control of the Russian army.