War in Ukraine: the Russian plan to stop the counter-offensive

War in Ukraine the Russian plan to stop the counter offensive

In a municipal building with a gutted roof, in Blahodatne, a village recaptured from Russian forces, on the southern front of the war, soldiers of the 68th Ukrainian brigade hoist the flag with yellow and blue stripes. “Glory to Ukraine, glory to the heroes”, reads the text that accompanies the video published on June 11 on the Facebook page of this unit. The Ukrainians intend to multiply this kind of images in the days and weeks to come. For its part, Russia insists on the loss or capture of vehicles such as American Bradley armored vehicles or German Leopard tanks.

To contain the enemy thrusts, Russian troops have had defenses that have been significantly reinforced in recent months. Obstacles and anti-tank ditches, minefields, trenches, concrete shelters: the Ukrainians face a system designed to trap, stop and destroy them, along with their dreams of reconquering the territories occupied since the invasions of 2014 and 2022 .

According to a French military source, up to “six successive lines” have been put in place on the southern strip of the front, the largest of which is about thirty kilometers from the line of contact. “It’s smart on the part of the Russian army: the problem is always to determine the axes of progression, esteem in a tweet Joseph Henrotin, researcher at the Center for Analysis and Forecasting of International Risks. By going deep, time is gained to shift reserves to areas where Ukraine wants to break through.”

For lack of sufficient manpower to hold all the lines of defense on a front which runs over nearly a thousand kilometres, the Russians are counting on the mobility of their troops. The Russian general Alexander Romanchuk, in charge of the occupied zone of Zaporijia, thus exposed his conception of an effective defense in an article published in May in a magazine.

Channeling Ukrainian forces into traps

More than a defensive vocation, the first curtain also has, according to him, an intelligence function. An offensive on a precise zone of the line of contact makes it possible to furnish the following lines with more experienced troops. “The main defense zone is organized to defeat possible penetrations, shelter and relaunch forces in the cover zone, receive and dispatch troops arriving from the reserve zone”, explains Vincent Tourret, research officer at the Foundation for strategic research.

This depth should also allow the Russians to concentrate their fire on the Ukrainian columns managing to infiltrate. “They surely have artillery plans prepared in advance to bombard defined areas very quickly, specifies General Nicolas Richoux. There could be less mined places in which the Russians will try to channel the enemy. he will think of engaging where he would not find anyone, but he could fall into an ambush and have his lead tanks destroyed.

A Ukrainian soldier enters a trench near the front in Bakhmut, Donetsk region, on February 21, 2023, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine

© / afp.com/Anatolii Stepanov

As they have already done in recent months, the Russians could also abandon certain positions to better target them once occupied, avoiding Ukrainian jamming devices. “The enemy is subjected to strikes and the drones correct the artillery fire, explained the ex-Russian officer Igor Girkin on Telegram. A tank counterattack follows with heavy air support to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from deploying their air defense systems and taking hold. This leads to the defeat of enemy assault units.”

However, he continues, the weather can reduce the possibilities of aftershocks and “complicate both the use of aviation and armored vehicles” by the Russians. As for the night fights, they seem to benefit the Ukrainians. These have “tactical advantages to carry out night assaults thanks to equipment provided by Westerners with superior night vision systems”, points out the Institute for the Study of War, based in Washington.

Moreover, the infantrymen deployed on the front by the Russians are far from having benefited from adequate training. The failure to capture Kiev in late winter 2022 and the harsh fighting in the Donbass the following spring bled the experienced manpower the Russian army had before the invasion, forcing it to hold its lines with unseasoned soldiers. So many factors that can give the Ukrainian counter-offensive a chance.



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