For having dared to withdraw from the “17 + 1” cooperation forum, China’s Trojan horse in Central and Eastern Europe, and allowing the opening of a representative office of Taiwan in Vilnius, Lithuania is paying a very heavy price . Beijing began by closing its market to Lithuanian exports. Then the Chinese regime threatened to do the same for all European companies that would maintain production sites in Lithuania or continue to source their supplies there. By attacking the integrity of the single market, it is the economy of a Member State of the European Union that the Chinese leaders seek to asphyxiate.
power tool
At a time when geopolitical and economic dynamics are intimately linked, Beijing reminds us that trade policies are, more than ever, a tool of power. The Kremlin has understood this perfectly, which does not hesitate to intimidate Europeans by threatening to cut off the gas tap. But our American ally also when it uses extraterritoriality to sanction our companies or, as was the case during the Trump presidency, imposes tariffs on them that violate all the rules of international trade. Rules that the deep and lasting weakening of the World Trade Organization makes more and more difficult to enforce.
In this context of “militarization” of international trade, is the EU standing idly by? Certainly not. If Brussels can often be accused of lacking strategic vision and audacity on the diplomatic level, this is not the case in commercial matters. Over the past eighteen months, the European Commission has developed a whole series of tools which, if adopted by the European Parliament and the Twenty-Seven, will make it possible to better protect our fellow citizens and our businesses.
Playing on equal terms
This is particularly the case of the anti-coercive instrument, which aims to prevent European companies or states, like Lithuania today, from being the object of economic intimidation by third powers. The Commission also wants to ensure that our businesses, large and small, are not victims of unfair competition. In this regard, it has proposed limiting or even blocking access to European public markets for all third countries that do not open theirs to us. In a similar logic, it has developed a tool aimed at directly attacking States which, like China, massively subsidize their companies to strengthen their market share in Europe, or even take control of our companies.
More systemically, the EU is rethinking its trade policy in order to bring it into line with our industrial and climate ambitions. Brussels has finally understood that we cannot ask our industries and our farmers to comply with increasingly stringent standards while leaving them disarmed in the face of competition from regions of the world with different standards. In this perspective, the carbon border adjustment mechanism was designed to penalize imports from countries that do not respect the same environmental standards as Europe.
The role of France
By placing the adoption of these commercial instruments at the heart of the priorities of its presidency of the European Union, France is making a courageous, risky but essential gamble.
Courageous, because trade policies are technical, complex, in a word anything but “sexy”. As the EU is also this big organization that remains hopelessly devoid of any marketing sense, it has so far been unable to “sell” these measures to our citizens.
Risky, because in the union of nation-states that the EU remains, the Commission only proposes. It is therefore France that now has the difficult task of convincing the European Parliament and the other Member States to adopt these tools.
Essential, because without a strong trade policy, a sovereign Europe will remain nothing more than an ambition devoid of any reality.
The paradox is that if the President of the Republic succeeds in having these trade defense tools adopted, it will probably be one of the greatest achievements of the French Presidency of the EU. But also one of those for which French voters will give him the least credit next April.