Breakups often have their little phrases. At a recent symposium organized by a prestigious think tank in London, an English diplomat compared Franco-British relations to “incompatible theologies.” This semantic discovery will undoubtedly complete the already long list of expressions qualifying the relations between the two countries, from the famous “entente cordiale” to the “infernal agreement”, from the “impossible couple” to the “best enemies”. But what does it reveal on the eve of the Franco-British summit on March 10, the first since 2018?
The formula, striking, is in fact not new. Prime Minister Harold Wilson already spoke in the 1960s of the “theological difference” between France and Great Britain on the subject of the EEC. Europe, already, subject of friction between these two old countries which resemble each other so much and which everything, however, opposes.
Europe, Brexit, the words are out. The past seven years since Brexit have put a strain on relations between the two neighbours. There are also details that speak volumes. On the website of the French Embassy in the United Kingdom, the pages concerning the bilateral relationship seem frozen in time. Figures, statistics and observations date from before June 2016, in other words before Brexit. Seven years later, they have not been updated. Only the names of the ambassadors posted on either side of the Channel have changed. To avoid talking about things that annoy, we stopped the meters the day before the anger. In diplomacy, sometimes you have to act as if nothing had happened.
The scallop war
However, for long-time observers of Franco-British relations, such as John Lichfield, correspondent in France for almost thirty years, the estrangement is frank: “We have to go back to the war in Iraq to find this level of tension between our two country.” For him, the responsibility lies above all with Boris Johnson who did everything to raise the tension, “amuse the gallery and satisfy the traditionally Francophobic conservative press”. The fishing disputes in the English Channel are a good example. “That technical issue should have been settled in a week. Instead, Boris Johnson rolled over mechanics. His posturing was as ridiculous as it was pointless.” No one has forgotten the tabloid war headlines talking about “scallop war” (“the scallop war”) and Johnson threatening to send in the Navy.
Sophie Pedder, Bureau Chief The Economist in Paris since 2003, remembers very well the moment when bilateral relations hit rock bottom: “The Australian submarine affair in September 2021, just after the G7 in Cornwall, which had been quite tense, finished breaking France’s confidence in Great Britain.” Paris felt betrayed, and rightly so. For Sophie Pedder, it is not so much Brexit, but the personality of Boris Johnson that caused the break. “During the war in Iraq, our two countries were in deep disagreement, but respected the position of the other, she recalls. During the last Franco-British summit with Theresa May, in 2018, i.e. after the referendum of Brexit, relations were still cordial. It was Boris Johnson who broke the bond of trust, which is much more serious than a disagreement.”
Briton Mujtaba Rahman, director of the Europe department at the Eurasia Group risk and analysis center, remembers Boris Johnson’s last low blow against France. It dates from last November 23 when Johnson declared to CNN that France, “in denial”, had seen nothing coming in Ukraine. In the aftermath, Rahman receives a message from a senior French diplomat: “What a shame! How can we still believe this inveterate liar? I can’t wait to read his Memoirs which will be as close to reality as a Jules Verne novel.”
Marginal cooperation
Today, if mistrust persists, the relationship has nevertheless stabilized enough with Rishi Sunak in Downing Street to organize a bilateral summit. But in fact, what for? Defense issue, traditionally seen as the driving force of the relationship, exchanges are at half mast and the two Lancaster House treaties signed by Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron in 2010, aligning very ambitious defense projects, distant memories. For many military observers who prefer to whisper it, Lancaster House has become an empty shell. Any common industrial and strategic ambition has vanished. The plan for a Franco-British combat aircraft did not last very long. France had to partner with Germany and Spain while Britain chose Sweden, Italy and Japan. The Franco-British tactical drone projects, which were to be produced by Dassault and BAE Systems, also fell through due to strategic differences and industrial misunderstanding. On the operational side, the establishment of a joint expeditionary force of 10,000 men, which took ten years to set up, no longer meets the requirements on the ground. Not only has it not been deployed once, but it probably never will be. For Elie Tenenbaum, director of the Center for Security Studies at Ifri, “the fundamental structural choices of the two countries are too opposed. It is better to be pragmatic and focus on small practical, useful and quickly achievable projects”.
It is in fact at the margins that cooperation between the two countries works well. A few examples: during Operation Barkhane in Mali, Great Britain lent three Chinook helicopters to France, which were greatly appreciated. In terms of nuclear force, France and the United Kingdom share radiographic and hydrodynamic facilities in Valduc, Burgundy, and a joint technological research center in Aldermaston, Berkshire. In Estonia, a company of 250 French soldiers joined the battlegroup under British command and under the aegis of NATO. “All of this is far from being anecdotal”, believes Elie Tenenbaum, before adding “even if it is a little disappointing.” For this expert in strategic issues, the two countries could support each other in many geographical areas and on many subjects, from grouped purchases of ammunition for Ukraine to joint operations in the Indo-Pacific and in Africa, where the ” one could imagine a coordinated struggle against Wagner’s Russian militias”. The European Political Community precisely offers a space where to propose common political answers, or at least coordinated, to counter for example the new American protectionist measures and to discuss the division of the roles between Europeans and Americans within NATO. These discussions could take place before the Alliance summit, scheduled for July in Vilnius (Lithuania).
Mutual distrust
But for that, it is still necessary to share the same vision of the world. And this is where we come back to history. “We are doomed to these cycles of tension and relaxation”, believes Sophie Pedder. Contemporary historian Dominic Sandbrook, also a tabloid columnist DailyMail, agrees and even adds that our differences arise from mental reflexes that nothing could change: “For us, the French will always be our rivals, even the villains of history. The circumstances accentuate this prejudice more or less, but the mental software remains.” And this, even when the facts prove the contrary. “François Mitterrand was the first to offer his support and military aid to Margaret Thatcher during the Falklands War. was naturally on the side of Argentina, our enemies.” A Weltanschauung (vision of the world) divergent, coupled with an atavistic mistrust on the part of the English (but not the Scots, for example). And therefore an inexhaustible source for opportunists like Boris Johnson and Liz Truss, because always useful to discard and blame elsewhere.
A return of pragmatism to business across the Channel, in the form of a Labor government led by Keir Starmer, would it make it possible to restart the bilateral relationship under better auspices? This is the opinion of two Francophile writers, celebrated on both sides of the Channel, such as Sebastian Faulks and William Boyd. For Faulks, adept at scathing humor, “Starmer is arguably the least enthusiastic Labor leader in history, but unlike Liz Truss, he has an IQ over 100, a few manners and a vague idea of what’s going on. constitutes diplomacy. And unlike Johnson, he is honest, does not have a personality disorder and has the power to concentrate for more than 15 seconds. So, yes, relations should necessarily improve with a Labor government.” For Boyd, a Labor victory in the 2024 elections is the only solution to “rediscover common sense, the security of our old alliances and resume the course of our common solidarity with France”. And to add: “We absolutely must get out of this endgame as decadent as it is deadly in which the conservatives are engaged.”
While waiting for the 2024 elections, what can we expect from this summit between the Borne and Sunak governments? “Let the two countries talk to each other again, says Sophie Pedder. It may be symbolic, but it’s crucial.” Mujtaba Rahman adds: “Warm words, some small announcements and above all a change of tone”. A good start.