Russia’s full-scale attack in Ukraine has continued for more than ten months, and there are no signs of an end to the war.
asked two experts what is important in the development of the war situation in 2023.
The questions were answered by a visiting researcher from the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki Ilmari Käihkö and program director of the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute’s Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS). Fredrik Löjdquist.
Both emphasize caution in the assessment, as the first year of the war has shown how difficult it is to predict developments.
– There has never been a war in history where so much real-time information has been available, for example due to social media and open source intelligence. Nevertheless, we know very little about the actual strength of the armed forces of the parties, Löjdquist describes.
Who gets the initiative after the turn of the year?
The beginning of next year will be marked by a race to see who gets the initiative at the front.
According to Käihkö, both sides will bring significantly more troops to the front, which will change the balance of power in the war. We just don’t know in which direction the power relations will develop.
– Ukraine is trying to get [rintamalle] 10–20 new brigades, i.e. about 40,000–80,000 soldiers. According to his own words, Russia is getting more than 200,000 soldiers, says Käihkö.
– The one who can bring in enough troops and is able to attack first, makes the other one retreat. Thus, it gains the initiative and forces the other to take a defensive position. It’s a race against time to see who can get their troops ready to attack first.
According to Käihkö, attacks cannot be launched with untrained and insufficient forces. The losses are getting too big.
The frontline situation was examined by the following think tank ISW rate (you switch to another service) at the end of October, that the untrained conscripts sent by Russia to Ukraine have been practically nothing but cannon fodder at the front.
Käihkö emphasizes that Russia has tried to learn from the mistakes it made during the first year.
– Now the situation is completely different. Every Russian who goes to Ukraine knows that they are going to war, and not just to march forward and wait for flowers from the Ukrainian people, Käihkö describes.
Löjdquist estimates that from Russia’s point of view it makes sense to start a new major attack quickly, because economic sanctions and the country’s isolated position will hit Russia even worse next year.
– Putin and the Kremlin must show that they are able to regain the initiative of the war. Time is not on their side, so the sooner the better, Löjdquist says.
According to Käihkö, there are currently no signs that Russia could bring new troops and equipment to the front to start an attack quickly.
In recent weeks, however, Ukraine has signaled that it is certain that the Russian attack will begin soon.
– According to Ukraine’s positions, Russia’s major attack would start much earlier than we do [lännessä] we have been thinking.
Käihkö also emphasizes source criticism in the interpretation of Ukraine’s communication, because the country has been communicating about the course of the war throughout the year on two levels: on the one hand, it swears faith in its own people, and on the other hand, it maintains a constant threat, because it does not want the support of Western countries to end.
These messages are somewhat contradictory, says Käihkö.
Are there conditions for peace negotiations next year?
Recently, both Ukraine and Russia have been talking more and more often about possible peace negotiations. However, experts consider it unlikely that the peace negotiations will take place in 2023.
The government of Ukraine recently announced that it plans to hold a summit related to peace negotiations at the UN in February. Both sides have also listed the conditions for carrying out the peace talks.
However, Löjdquist estimates that “Minsk 3”-style peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia are not likely next year.
– There is very little common ground to negotiate. Negotiations now would only lead to a frozen conflict, which would give Russia time to strengthen its forces for a new attack.
According to Löjdquist, in the best case we can talk about a ceasefire, not a peace agreement. Fatigue on both sides and a stalemate on the front could lead to a ceasefire.
– A ceasefire would lead to the situation in Korea, and it would know a new cold war. After that, we would have a new Berlin wall somewhere towards Ukraine, Löjdquist describes the symbolic setting.
Ilmari Käihkö says that it largely depends on the situation at the front, whether there are conditions for peace negotiations.
– Ukraine and Russia both believe that they can militarily improve their own situation. In that sense, peace negotiations are not current, Käihkö estimates.
In the United States, the president Joe Biden in discussions with Ukrainian leaders, the administration has urged to communicate openness to possible negotiations with Russia.
According to Käihkö, Ukraine has been “definitely pushed” by Western countries towards the possibility of peace negotiations.
– We don’t want Ukraine to be so absolute in its demands that the demands are an obstacle to peace. It is clear that this pressure has been applied to Ukraine.
Käihkö also emphasizes that the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi has softened his views and no longer considers negotiations with Russia impossible, even if Putin is in power.
– Now the position is that we are ready for negotiations if Putin is ready to make concessions.
However, Zelenskyi’s position is still that a peace agreement can only come about if Russia withdraws to the positions that preceded the attack.
Löjdquist estimates that there are no prerequisites for peace negotiations. As long as Putin is in power, Russia’s goal is to force all of Ukraine under its political influence, not just conquer parts of Ukraine.
Löjdquist also does not believe that the fall of Putin’s regime is likely next year, as there will hardly be a revolt by the people or the military leaders.
The biggest threat to Putin is his inner circle, Löjdquist estimates. Those close to us may feel that “Putin’s war” will turn into a danger to Russia’s existence if success on the front continues to be weak. Löjdquist still does not consider a palace coup likely.
– I can’t imagine how it would happen.
Will attacks on infrastructure break Ukraine’s will to fight?
According to experts, Russian attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure will continue next year.
According to Löjdquist, Russia is increasingly resorting to artillery war in order to worsen the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, especially if Russia does not have enough strength to advance on the battle front.
More artillery strikes against Ukraine’s electricity and water supply infrastructure can be expected, as Russia is trying to cause a wider refugee crisis from Ukraine to the rest of Europe. That would erode the unity of the West, Löjdquist predicts.
Käihkö reminds us that although Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure have not broken the will to fight on the home front, Ukraine’s economy is suffering a lot from the attacks.
– If the frontline situation freezes and at the same time the attacks against the infrastructure continue, then at some point it will also affect morale, describes Käihkö.
Is there enough material?
Russia has suffered big losses in the war. Ukraine claims that Russia lost nearly 100,000 soldiers and a significant amount of equipment between February and December. There is no unbiased information.
According to Käihkö, great uncertainty next year is also related to how Russia will manage to patch up the soldiers’ weak equipment level.
According to Löjdquist, the economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia will hit the country’s economy harder this year. In the long term, the country’s economy is in an inexorable decline.
For example, the import ban and price ceiling imposed by the EU and the G7 countries on Russian oil will probably significantly cut Russia’s budget resources.
However, over the course of the year, Russia has moved more and more clearly into a war economy, where society is harnessed to continue warfare. According to Löjdquist, it is difficult to predict how much Russia’s downward economic development will affect its ability to wage war next year.
Experts from the National Defense University (MPKK) assessed to in September that Russia is increasing its domestic weapons production and acquiring weapons from its partners, but the lack of microchips necessary for Russia may force it to limit the use of highly accurate weapons.
Even less is known about the losses suffered by Ukraine and the true state of the material than Russia, says Fredrik Löjdquist.
– It is remarkable how well Ukraine has been able to prevent data leaks.
However, according to Käihkö, Ukraine was running out of artillery ammunition already in May of this year, which shows how dependent Ukraine is on armed support from the West next year as well.
Käihkö says that the protracted war will emphasize the production capacity of the countries supporting Ukraine and Russia. According to Käihkö, private companies in the West have been reluctant to establish new production lines for the armed support of Ukraine without political decisions on long-term orders.
– In Russia, there has been much more talk about increasing production. They are trying to harness industry for this purpose.
Will the West stay united?
The most decisive factor for next year’s direction is the unity of the Western countries and the continuation of the military support offered by the West to Ukraine, experts say.
Käihkö emphasizes that the armed and other support provided by the West is the only way Ukraine can balance the power imbalance of the war. The continuation of armed support next year is therefore essential for Ukraine.
Käihkö reminds that there have been considerable differences in the provision of support in Western countries.
– For example, the Baltic countries have given more compared to their size. Some countries, on the other hand, have talents that they have not wanted to give, says Käihkö.
According to Löjdquist, the support for Ukraine seems unshakable at the turn of the year, but there are discussions behind closed doors about how much the West should support Ukraine.
– Maybe it is said that Ukraine should not try to retake Crimea.
Löjdquist says that Putin is trying to divide the West more and more strongly into two groups, so that some Western countries start sending messages to Kiev that concessions and compromises must be made to Zelensky.
Löjdquist predicts that politicians in the West will have an increasing challenge to explain to their own voters the importance of supporting Ukraine, while at the same time the world economy is headed for recession with galloping inflation and high interest rates.
According to him, the leadership of Western countries now has a “huge task” to remind Putin of Putin’s ultimate goal.
– This is not a local or regional conflict in Ukraine, but an imperialist and colonialist war. This is an attack on the entire rules-based international system, says Löjdquist.
You can discuss the topic until 11:00 p.m. on December 30, 2012.
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