Michel Goya, former colonel of the navy troops, follows the Ukrainian conflict day after day for BFMTV. With L’Express, he looks back on the war of attrition in the process of being set up and describes under what conditions Ukraine and Russia hope to win, ultimately. In his mind, Western public opinion is the “weakest link” in the conflict.
L’Express: Six months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, what phase of the conflict have we entered?
Michael Goya: The forehead doesn’t move much anymore. The month of August which has just passed is the month when there have been the fewest territories conquered by one or the other. So we are entering a phase of stiffening operations. This is common in wars. If the big phase of maneuvers does not succeed, it leads to a fixation of things, which can last for years. Today is a bit like 1915.
Are we to understand that the Ukrainian and Russian armies are now of the same strength?
Let’s say they no longer have sufficient offensive capabilities to surprise. Take the Kherson area, it’s flat, full of small villages. If the Ukrainians want to carry out a counter-offensive, they must bring in the artillery. All of this is visible to drones, so in the aftermath the Russian military would fire. Russian artillery has a massive capacity to fire 20 or even 30 kilometers, and rocket launchers can fire up to 80 kilometers.
Under these conditions, are strikes still useful?
Yes, these are pounding attacks. One tries to harass and exhaust the adversary, by destroying his resources. This has been the Russian strategy from the start. To their credit, we can recognize two victories. The capture of Mariupol and that of the area of Sievierodonetsk and Lyssytchansk. In five months, it’s still quite a bit, especially since to conquer the Donbass, the objective was to also seize Sloviansk and Kramatovsk. The Russians are extremely embarrassed by the strategy of the Ukrainians which consists in systematically firing on their depots of ammunition and shells.
Does the Russians’ ability to resupply ammunition surprise you?
This is one of the great unknowns of war. We know that the Russians live on Soviet ammunition stocks, which are colossal. What strikes me is that the Russian army is fighting like forty or fifty years ago. They fire a lot of ammo, but it’s unclear how much they have left.
How much longer can Russia hold out?
We don’t know, but the Russians still have a troop problem, both qualitative and quantitative. The Ukrainians eliminated a number of senior officers, which caused some disorganization on the Russian side. And there is the problem of numbers. The Ukrainians potentially have an army of 700,000 men, compared to 40,000 to 50,000 Russians. They are recruiting, casting a wide net, but it won’t be enough. We can also be surprised that they do not sound the general mobilization. It is all the same the first war in which we see a dictatorship which does not dare to mobilize the population in the war effort. What this shows is that the Russian authorities mistrust the population and seek to keep them at a distance. Therefore, one can think that defeats could be fatal to the regime, at some point.
In general, Russian regimes don’t really like defeats, just look back to 1917. It’s easy to understand: sacrifices are only accepted if you have the feeling that it’s for something. There are three phases in the feeling of the population, generally. At the beginning, the losses tighten the links, we relate to the idea of victory. Then there is the second phase, in which we could have entered: we begin to doubt but we continue because we do not want to have paid for nothing. The third phase is that of the collapse, when one realizes that the losses are useless. This is what Vladimir Putin can avoid.
With its 700,000 men, how to explain that the Ukrainian army fails to push back the Russians?
The Ukrainian army has great potential, but lacks training. There is no point in having troops if they are disorganized, poorly equipped, poorly commanded. If Ukraine wants to regain the advantage in the balance of power against Russia, it needs a great investment in the training of its army. This training, it is the Westerners who can take care of it. Officially, the French are not present in Ukraine but this can take place in a border country.
How much longer can this war of attrition last?
Years ! The belligerents will only use the diplomatic channel once they are each convinced that they can no longer advance. It’s not yet the case. At the same time, regaining offensive forces that allow you to take the advantage over the opposing party, it takes time when you can no longer play on the element of surprise. In any case, I don’t see major upheavals before 2023, given the state of the two armies. Russia is partly playing with time. She dreams of the help of the “general winter”: that is to say the Western opinion which, worried about cuts or the price of energy, would ask for a withdrawal of aid to Ukraine. The weak link will never be the Ukrainians, who will not crack, but it can be us. When I say “we”, it is first of all the Americans since they provide 70% of the military aid. Imagine the Republicans coming back to power in two years. One can wonder whether aid would then be called into question. That’s what the Russians are hoping for.
For their part, the Ukrainians can try to do what the Croats did in 1995, in Kranija. The Serbs had conquered positions, a ceasefire agreement had been signed in 1994. The Americans had helped Croatia covertly, notably via private security companies, by giving it the means, little by little, to carry out a lightning offensive. This is what happened at the beginning of August 1995. The Serbs were driven out. Russia remembers this story very well.
With L’Express, Volodymyr Zelensky evokes a Ukrainian “counter-offensive” to come. Should we take him at his word?
There is an element of bluff in this speech. So far, no Ukrainian counter-offensive has really worked. So what President Zelensky probably has in mind is the slow reconstitution of the Ukrainian forces until they can carry out a large-scale operation. But it’s not for tomorrow.
Regarding France, could we not help Ukraine more? Only 18 Caesar guns were sent to kyiv, that’s not a lot.
In theory, we could give other weapons, including our multiple rocket launchers, which can fire up to 80 kilometers. But there is undoubtedly a will not to disarm. Above all, the situation showed the French limits in terms of armament. If we want to weigh, it is necessary to get out of crafting and get back to producing weapons. And that, again, will take time.
Without the help of the West, would Ukraine have been crushed?
It is certain that without military aid from the West, the map of the front would be very different.
In the columns of L’Express, Volodymyr Zelensky asks Westerners to help him “control” the Ukrainian sky. Would setting up a no-fly zone be of interest?
In my opinion, it is not obvious. For one thing, Russian planes are not in the sky. This is one of the surprises of this war. They remain cautious, behind the front line. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, need anti-aircraft missiles, but mastering their use takes time. On the other hand, it would mean an entry into the war of NATO, or almost. And the golden rule, shared by everyone, is that the nuclear powers do not clash.
There may be clashes, but a war is something else. In 1983, under Ronald Reagan, the US Army ran the Proud Prophet simulation for two weeks. It was training for a war with the USSR. In all scenarios, the nuclear weapon was used and it ended in general annihilation. Everyone has that in mind, including the Russians.