ASSEMBLED DISSOLUTION. These legislative elections have reshuffled the cards, leaving the presidential camp without a stable majority. At a time when institutional paralysis threatens the French political system, could dissolution become the solution?
[Mis à jour le 22 juin à 20h42] Could the deputies newly elected to the National Assembly after the legislative elections never exercise their mandate? The thesis seems highly improbable as a dissolution of the National Assembly (which can only be announced by the President of the Republic according to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, at most once a year) would be perceived as a coup de force and a denial of democracy right after an election. The term dissolution was logically not used during Emmanuel Macron’s speech this Wednesday, June 22, the President of the Republic mentioned the need to “build compromises in complete transparency in a desire for union and action for the nation”, promising to respect the “clear wills” that emerged from the presidential and legislative elections.
Nevertheless, a dissolution of the National Assembly during this five-year term of Emmanuel Macron still seems inevitable in view of a probable situation of political deadlock generated by the results of the 2022 legislative elections, which saw no majority emerge. . Emmanuel Macron mentioned this point when he mentioned “theresponsibility of the presidential majority” to “expand”, adding: “We must collectively learn to govern and legislate differently […] in dialogue, listening and respect. It doesn’t have to mean standing still.”
If he were to make in a few weeks, months or next years the observation of an ungovernable France, Emmanuel Macron could he take this very big political risk? The gesture, if it were premature or badly perceived by the electorate, could turn against him and further weaken his political base and the number of his supporters in the Assembly. In fact, the second round of the legislative elections had the effect of a slap in the face for the presidential camp, the formation Ensemble! falling to 246 seats, far from the 308 deputies sent to the Assembly in 2017. And since then, speculation has been rife on the method that the head of state will use to avoid a political deadlock.
With 142 seats for the new left-wing coalition, the Nupes, driven by strong electoral mobilization around and the historic breakthrough of the RN, with 89 elected, the opposition has solidified (and polarized!). It will also be necessary to deal with a surviving right which, if it goes from 112 deputies to 65, has saved the furniture. From now on, Emmanuel Macron and his relative majority will be forced to negotiate alliances and make compromises for each reform project. More worrying still, the feverishness of a government weakened by the electoral rout of three of its ministers in the legislative elections (who will therefore have to pack up) and by the uncertain future of a Prime Minister whose legitimacy is (almost) unanimously challenged by the opposition.
Faced with this political fragmentation, will the government be “impeded”? How to prevent France from becoming ungovernable? These crucial questions illustrate the uncertainty that surrounds the start of this mandate. At the top of the state, no option is excluded, explains The world. The government could decide to build a majority “on a case-by-case basis” for each file, by trying to bring together the 289 deputies needed to vote on laws (i.e. the absolute majority threshold). But the simplest would remain the elaboration of a legislative agreement, or even a government pact, with another group. In this case, one would expect Emmanuel Macron to turn to the Republicans, a party with which he has fewer points of difference than with the RN or Nupes. But for now, the possibility of a rapprochement has been ruled out by the right-wing party. On June 21, Christian Jacob, president of the party, reiterated on France Inter the will of his group to appear as a “firm opposition”, even affirming: “The answer will not be in tricks and shenanigans”. Together! could therefore find themselves very isolated the day after this electoral period… Unless they pursue it by calling the French people to the polls by dissolving the National Assembly.
The President of the Republic has the right to proceed with a parliamentary dissolution: this consists of prematurely ending the mandate of the National Assembly. This is the last resort in the event of an extreme situation: when the president does not have a stable majority in the Assembly, or in the event of a crisis. It can be perceived as the essential loophole in the event that the country’s policy is blocked, or that we are witnessing an institutional paralysis, with a level of dissensus such that the governance of the country becomes impossible. In fact, when the opposition is too powerful in the hemicycle and the presidential camp fails to form alliances to pass the laws provided for in its program, the country can get bogged down in immobility. By provoking new legislative elections, the dissolution makes it possible to solicit the voters so that they designate another majority, heard one which will support its action.
Provided for in Article 12 of the Constitution, the dissolution may be pronounced by the President of the Republic “after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Presidents” of the National Assembly and the Senate”. Its relatively simple mechanism is mainly based on the President’s will. As such, in his book “Les dissolutions sous la Ve République” published in 1997, the constitutionalist Jean-Claude Zarka speaks of it as a “quasi-discretionary competence” of the President of the Republic, the only obligations enshrined in the Constitution being the prior consultation of the Prime Minister and the two presidents of the parliamentary chambers (knowing that he only gives a purely advisory opinion. In addition, this exercise is a prerogative exempt from ministerial countersignature provided for in the article 19, which means that it only depends on the President of the Republic.
The Constitution provides some limitations to the right of dissolution. On the one hand, the president cannot dissolve the National Assembly during the exercise of the exceptional powers provided for by article 16 of the constitution. On the other hand, dissolution is also prohibited when the President of the Senate exercises the interim of the Presidency of the Republic, as provided for in Article 7 of the Constitution. The only truly binding rules governing the dissolution of the Assembly relate to time limits. The Constitution specifies that the Head of State must wait one year between two dissolutions. But in the present case, Emmanuel Macron will not have to wait because, as specified The world, the time limit to be observed after a legislative election is not specified in the law and can be reduced to nil according to constitutional interpretation. Once the dissolution has been pronounced, the convocation of new legislative elections must take place “twenty days at least and forty days at most after the dissolution”.
Dissolving the Assembly could end up becoming an option to get out of the institutional crisis that currently threatens the country. After the legislative slap will come the time of slowing down, even of immobility, when the new government will want to pass its first laws. Indeed, how to find a point of agreement on issues as divisive as pension reform or ecological planning? The reforming capacity of the government risks being largely hampered by an impossibility of finding a compromise with the forces of the opposition. In fact, in Parliament, the relative majority of Emmanuel Macron will have difficulty in forging alliances. But this will not be less true for the other forces in power, starting with the Nupes, which must already manage internal differences, the PS and LFI having very distant positions on many subjects. On the side of the RN, if the party seems united internally, the logic of the republican front, but also the “anti-system” positioning could prevent a rapprochement with other parties. Thus, a dissolution of the National Assembly would allow the Head of State to cut short the talks which promise to be laborious, or even simply to ensure that he can govern without blockage by aiming to win, this time, an absolute majority.
Is the hypothesis of a dissolution of the National Assembly by Emmanuel Macron in the event of re-election really possible? Factually, yes. On the other hand, politically, the operation promises to be more delicate. Both for the image sent back to the parliamentarians with whom he will have to deal for the next five years and to public opinion, he to whom the “Jupiterian” image already sticks. But the main risk lies in the outcome of these new elections. In the event of further disappointment (or even defeat) at the polls, it would be difficult for his side to recover. “If the result (of the vote) is the same, it would be a terrible political setback”, explained to CheckNews the doctor of public law Aïda Manouguian.
And how can you be sure it’s the right strategy? Nothing says that this dissolution would be conclusive for the presidential camp. According to Bruno Cautrès, political scientist and researcher at the CNRS, it is a “double-edged sword”, as he explained to our colleagues from France Info. “Given the half-hearted popularity of the two heads of the executive, this could be a gift to Jean-Luc Mélenchon”, he warned, referring to the significantly lower scores of the head of state at the presidential election and the Prime Minister whose future at Matignon hangs by a thread. Not to mention the growing electoral base of the two major opposing camps, namely the Nupes and the RN, which have clearly progressed at the polls in the last elections.
Above all, an immediate dissolution could seem hasty, even disconnected from democratic reality. While abstention reached a very high level (53.77% during this second round), voters could have the feeling that the President is ignoring their voices. “It is not interesting for the president to dissolve the Assembly immediately”, explained to France Info professor of public law at the University of Lille Jean-Philippe Derosier. “The poll has just taken place. To dissolve immediately is to refuse to recognize the voters’ choice.” According to him, opting for this radical choice “before the government encounters difficulties” in its governance would be “an extremely risky strategy politically”. On April 17, long before all these events, Emmanuel Macron assured that he would not consider such an eventuality: “I have too much respect for democratic meetings to shake them up or give the feeling, in a way, of playing with them. ” But today, the situation is very different.
There have been five dissolutions of the National Assembly in the history of the Fifth Republic… And all of them did not lead to the same result. Twice, it was used to respond to a national crisis: it was a success for Charles de Gaulle, who extricated himself from particularly delicate situations by obtaining a solid majority in 1962 and 1968. But, out of the three which were intended to consolidate (even to build) the majority of the presidential camp in the Assembly, one of them was a marked failure. One thinks here of Jacques Chirac’s failed electoral gamble in 1997, who dissolved Parliament with the aim of obtaining a larger majority and thus avoiding any ounce of political blockage during the passing of laws. He finally lost everything when the Socialists ousted him at the ballot box, propelling Lionel Jospin to the post of Prime Minister and forcing Jacques Chirac to live together. It remains to be seen whether, in the case of Emmanuel Macron, a possible dissolution would be justified by parliamentary paralysis or by the need to overcome political divisions to overcome a crisis. Or if it would appear as a desperate attempt to oust the opposition.