The European Union showed unprecedented solidarity when the war broke out in Ukraine. Faced with the Russian aggressor, the 27 member countries have succeeded in uniting to fight, with economic sanctions, the warlike tendencies of Moscow. But today, dissensions are more and more visible between the member countries, and sometimes even inside the States. On June 7, less than a month after applying to NATO, the Swedish government escaped a motion of no confidence by one vote. Last week in Estonia, Prime Minister Kaja Kallas demanded the dismissal of the seven center ministers, whose party is the government ally of her formation. In Bulgaria too, the ruling coalition seems to be cracking.
If they appear more clearly in this context of war at the gates of Europe, can these divisions endanger the stability of European countries? Joséphine Staron, director of studies and international relations of the Synopia think tank, and doctor of political philosophy at the Sorbonne University, “does not think that there will be a profound destabilization of the regimes”. But “everything will also depend on the outcome of the conflict”. Maintenance.
L’Express: Has the unity displayed by the member countries of the European Union at the start of the war in Ukraine eroded?
Josephine Staron: I don’t think that unity is crumbling, but some of the divisions that existed before the war started are still there. Initially, there was enthusiasm, unprecedented solidarity from European countries, commensurate with the unprecedented situation of the war. Governments were flabbergasted. But when the question of the solutions to be provided to settle the conflict arose, knowing that the option of military intervention had been ruled out from the outset, economic sanctions presented themselves as the only lever of action for the Europeans and they may have aroused reluctance because there are different levels of dependence between European states in relation to Moscow. Inevitably, when the countries entered into negotiations on the question of energy matters, this awakened the disparities that already existed.
In addition to the economic aspect, we note that the members of the EU do not all have the same vision of support for Ukraine, in particular the Baltic countries which are ready to help kyiv “until victory” against the couple Franco-German who does not want to “humiliate” Vladimir Putin…
It is true that there is a question of geographical proximity and different historical links between these countries. Eastern European countries have a special history with the USSR because they were part of it. There is therefore a more pronounced distrust among the population who see Russia as a hegemonic neighbor, and indeed it has been for decades. The Baltic countries have been warning for 40 years that Russia is the number one danger for Europe, and an immediate danger geographically. Conversely, on the definition of a priority enemy, in the West, France and other countries such as Great Britain, Spain or Italy, have rather turned towards Africa and the Middle East, towards the dangers linked to terrorism, and in particular in the Sahel. And it’s been going on for decades.
France, which had kept good relations with Russia, tried to maintain dialogue, and continue its historical diplomatic tradition of being a form of mediator between the great powers. It is also its status as a nuclear power which gives it this legitimacy which can be respected by Vladimir Putin.
As far as Germany is concerned, there has been a tradition of very controlled armament policy since the end of the Second World War. The country has a very complex relationship to war. If at the beginning of the Russian invasion, there was a craze to defend Ukraine, when it was necessary to go further on the questions of sending heavy weapons, it was more complicated. The same for the question of Russian gas, because the country is very dependent on this raw material.
The disunity can also be seen through the question of Ukraine’s candidacy for the European Union…
This subject also brings up two different visions of the EU. There are those in favor of expanding the alliance. They see the EU as a big economic market and not as a political union. On the other hand, there is the camp of the Western European countries, the founding countries, which have a more political vision of the EU, and which, rather than an ever greater enlargement, first of all want a deepening of European integration. It is in this sense that Emmanuel Macron’s proposal formulated on May 9 should be understood when he speaks of a European political community which would integrate Ukraine but also the Balkan countries.
Within the countries themselves, we see dissonant voices appearing, as in Sweden, where divisions are felt regarding NATO membership. Why ?
Sweden is traditionally neutral. She chose not to be part of any alliance and this was negotiated upon the fall of the USSR. So some of the Swedes are worried about this change which assigns them to one camp to the detriment of another. This is also the case for the Finns who renounce their historical neutrality, with the risk of being considered by the Russian camp as an enemy. We must not overlook the shock that this can cause in these countries. However, there seems to be a real consensus within the populations to join NATO, and this because of the war in Ukraine which “awakened” fears vis-à-vis the Russian neighbor.
Opposition is also rising in Bulgaria not to get more involved in the Ukrainian conflict. Can we fear an internal destabilization of European regimes because of the war?
It should be remembered that Bulgaria has a historical and geographical proximity to Russia. There is a larger Russian-speaking and Russophile population than in western Europe, so divisions within the population between a vision of neutrality in this conflict and a vision that would like to bring Russia down. But I don’t think there will be a profound destabilization of regimes. Everything will also depend on the outcome of the war. Because today the sanctions cannot go much further, arms deliveries are drying up and there is still no question of a military intervention. The question is whether European citizens will accept to live with the consequences of the sanctions for a long time yet (inflation, increase in the price of raw materials, energy insecurity).
Could the food crisis caused by the war be another element of disruption of political regimes in Europe?
From the moment that inflation does not stop rising everywhere in Europe, that the prices of raw materials soar like those of energy, we have fertile ground for a major social crisis. This is where we see the limits of economic sanctions, because the Europeans are the first to be affected. Russia has indeed prepared for these sanctions, and the Russian people are a people at war, unlike the European peoples, so their resilience may be greater, or at least longer. Solidarity can wither if the consequences are too heavy.
For several weeks in Poland, which has taken in millions of refugees, the government has stopped paying for the aid of these refugees because the Polish economy is reaching the end of what it can do in terms of solidarity. All states will find themselves faced with this moral choice to continue to support kyiv or to listen to the economic and social problems within their own country. The question will quickly arise if the conflict continues.
But before the revolt of the peoples, the States will try to get out of the vicious circle of sanctions which they themselves have imposed and which do not prevent Vladimir Putin from continuing his war. There will undoubtedly be adjustments to the level of sanctions or decisions taken at European level to try to compensate. However, if we actually arrive at a recession, with real social and economic crises, the population is likely to say stop. And this does not only concern European countries, but also certain African countries which are going to demand that Westerners help to lift the blockade on cereals.