Arvid Åhlund: Scholz sounds like Merkel 2022 but reasons like Merkel 2014

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The American journalist Kati Marton’s Merkel biography from last autumn describes how Barack Obama gets tired of trying to speak out for Vladimir Putin during the Crimean crisis in 2014. The Russian president refuses to make sense.

Instead, the lot falls on Angela Merkel. She talks to Putin a total of 35 times, strongly believes in her own ability to reach out but makes basically the same mistake as Obama. Both are hyper-rational and prefer Putin to be the same. War solves zero.

In its first interview after the invasion of Ukraine Merkel makes a radically different analysis. Military force is the only language Putin understands. He hates the West, wants to crush Europe, has always been the same and will never change – least of all through in-depth trade. She has never had any other illusions.

In that light, the Chancellor’s defense of the Russian oil pipeline Nord Stream 2 becomes incomprehensible, and her refusal to supply Ukraine with weapons in 2014-15 appears to be a clear strategic mistake.

Macron considers himself so good at instilling reason in others that he speaks openly about the importance of not humiliating Putin in public.

Of course you can object that it is easy to be hindsighted. But then it would at least be good if the current head of government Olaf Scholz showed that the Germans learned the lesson.

In fact, he is severely ambivalent. Scholz speaks as Merkel 2022, but reasons dangerously similar to Merkel 2014. Germany acts historically resolutely. Putin “must not win”. At the same time, arms deliveries are slowing down and an in-depth dialogue with the Kremlin is a must – preferably immediately.

Scholz is not alone. Large and important parts of the German elite reason similarly, as does Macron in France. He considers himself so good at instilling reason in others that he speaks openly about the importance of not humiliating Putin in public. In practice, this means less support for Kyiv and more negotiations with the Kremlin.

The risk is that such a solution would lock in Russian conquests and confirm Putin’s basic instinct that the West always gives in when it really matters. No one outside the Kremlin wins.

The right line is and remains the American. Preferably peace negotiations, but from a Ukrainian position of strength.

Send more weapons.

Read more texts by Arvid Åhlund

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